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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and 
for Twin Falls County, Honorable Randy J. Stoker, presiding. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's review following a bench trial is "limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." 
Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 48, 408 P.3d 45, 48 (2017). This Court will not set aside a 
trial court's findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous." Id. Clear error will not be deemed 
to exist if the findings are "supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence." 
Id. "If there is evidence in the record that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in 
making the factual finding challenged on appeal, there is substantial and competent evidence." Id. 
Over matters of law, this Court exercises free review and is unbound by the trial court's 
legal conclusions, meaning it is free to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented. Id.; see 
also Elec. Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 820, 41 P .3d 242, 248 (2001) 
(holding that the Supreme Court exercises free review over the lower court's conclusions of law 
to determine (1) whether the comi correctly stated the applicable law and (2) whether the legal 
conclusions are sustained by the facts found). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Case 
This case presents a question regarding the proper application of the elements of an unjust 
enrichment claim, specifically, whether or not the trial court properly analyzed and applied the 
first element of a prima facie unjust enrichment claim. This case also presents a question regarding 
whether or not it was error for the trial court to apply the affirmative defense of the officious 
intermeddler rule when it was never once pied or asserted before trial or argued during trial. 
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Finally, this case presents a question concerning whether or not the trial court erred m its 
conclusion that the officious intermeddler rule applied under the facts presented at trial. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Kenworth Sales Company ("Kenworth") is a licensed dealer engaged in the business of 
selling and buying commercial trucks . R. 185. Skinner Trucking, Inc. ("STI") is a business 
engaged in the commodity transportation business. R. 185-186. The two companies have done 
business together for more than forty years, during which STI leased a number of trucks sold by 
Kenworth. R. 186; Tr. 67. 1 GE TF Trust ("GE") is a financing entity that, among other things, 
purchases vehicles from Kenworth for lease to companies such as STI. R. 186. 
In 08/18/11, STI selected three new Kenworth trucks, which Kenworth sold to GE and GE 
leased to STI under a four-year TRAC lease. Id. The provisions of the lease established a residual 
payoff amount that was due on each of the three trucks at the end of the lease period. Id. That 
amount was set at $58,051.20 per truck. R. 187. At the end of the lease period, STI had the option 
of purchasing the trucks for that amount or turning them in and waiting for the trucks to be sold. 
R. 186. If the sales amount exceeded the residual amount, STI was to receive a surplus. Id. If the 
trucks were to sell for less than that amount, STI was obligated to pay the difference. Id. James 
and David Skinner personally guaranteed STI's lease obligations to GE. Id. 
As the lease period ended in October of 2015, STI was experiencing financial hardship. 
Id. Therefore, STI found itself unable to (1) sell the trucks, (2) purchase the trucks by paying off 
the residual amount, or (3) obtain financing to pay off the residual amount. Id. At this time, STI 
was also behind on its lease payments to GE by approximately $7,000.00. Id. 
1 Most references to the Transcript on Appeal in this case will be to the transcript prepared by Tracy Barksdale, 
which includes the trial transcript. To avoid any confusion, these references will use the designation 'Tr." while any 
citation to the transcript prepared by Candice Childers will use the designation "Supp. Tr." for supplemental 
transcript. 
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Kenworth was aware of these circumstances and, as STI was a valued long-term customer, 
did not wish to see its financial situation worsen if the trucks were to be sold quickly at auction. 
R. 186-187. Ken worth discussed the matter with James Skinner on a number of occasions and 
ultimately, in the late fall and early winter of 2015, STI surrendered the trucks to Kenworth. R. 
187. At the time of surrender, the value of each truck was $42,000.00. Id. This was partly the 
result of STI's decision to strip off and sell each truck's auxiliary power unit before surrender for 
a total of $12,000.00. Tr. 74, 95-96. 
Kenworth subsequently paid off the residual amount on each truck and the $7,073.17 in 
delinquent lease payments, ending the Defendants' obligation under the lease to GE. R. 187. This 
was done in an effort to buy STI more time to make good on their financial obligations, without 
incurring additional late fees and legal costs. R. 186-187; Tr. 111-112. In January of 2016, 
Kenworth invoiced STI for $55,226.77, the difference between the value of the trucks at surrender 
and their respective residual amounts, as well as the unpaid lease payments. R. 187. The trucks 
remained unsold on Kenworth's lot until the Spring of 2017, when they sold for $34,500 each. R. 
188. Neither STI, Jim Skinner, nor David Skinner ever responded to Kenworth's invoice. Tr. 76-
77. 
A. The Proceedings Below 
This matter comes to this Court on appeal of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (the "Decision"), issued on 12/19/17 following a one-day court trial and 
post-trial briefing. In the Decision, the trial court entered judgment for the Defendants with 
regard to Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim, finding that (I) with regard to the residual amounts 
under the lease, Plaintiff conferred no benefit on the Defendants and (2) with regard to the past 
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due lease payments, assuming a prima facie case of unjust enrichment was established, the 
officious intenneddler rule precluded recovery. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial comi err in its analysis/application of the elements of a prima facie 
unjust enrichment case? 
B. Did the trial court err in both considering and then applying the officious intermeddler 
affirmative defense, when it was never pled by the Defendants/Respondents in their 
Answer or asserted either at trial or in any brief filed by the Defendants/Respondents 
prior to their closing brief filed after trial? 
C. Did the trial court err in applying the officious intermeddler affirmative defense when 
there was evidence presented at trial that Kenworth had a valid reason for conferring a 
benefit on STI? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred When It Determined that With Regard to the Residual 
Amount Under the Lease, Kenworth's Actions Conferred No Benefit on the 
Defendants/Respondents. 
The district court erred when it determined that there was no benefit conferred on the 
Defendants/Respondents by Kenworth because the district court incorrectly applied Idaho caselaw 
on the matter, applying only a portion of the legal standard while ignoring the remainder. The 
evidence presented demonstrated that at the time that the vehicles were surrendered, they were 
worth $42,000.00 apiece and that STI was broke and unable to either sell the trucks, purchase the 
trucks for the residual amounts, or obtain financing to pay off the residual amounts. The evidence 
also established that ifKenworth had not stepped in and payed off the residual amounts to GE, the 
trucks would have sold at a quick auction, wherein they would likely have sold for below the value 
placed on them by Kenworth, leaving STI and the Skinner brothers on the hook for the difference. 
Kenwo1ih's action terminated the Defendants/Respondents' liability under the lease to GE, and 
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for this reason, the district court should have held that Kenworth's actions conferred a benefit on 
thereon. 
i. The District Court erred by failing to apply the entire legal test for the first element 
of an unjust enrichment claim. 
The district court held that when Kenworth paid GE for the outstanding residual amounts 
owed by STI under the lease, doing so did not confer a benefit on the Defendants/Respondents. R. 
191-192. However, in making such a determination, the court only partially applied the applicable 
legal test. 
To establish the first element of a prima facie unjust enrichment claim, one must prove the 
existence of "a benefit conferred upon a defendant by a plaintiff." Med. Recove,y Services, LLC 
v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). A 
benefit is considered conferred when one "gives the other some interest in money, land, or 
possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of the 
other, or in any other way adds to the other's advantage." Id. The district court correctly cited to 
this language in its Decision, but then proceeded to only partially apply the test. 
In its analysis on this issue, the court determined that because Kenwo11h paid GE the exact 
amount owing on the lease (i.e. the full residual amounts for each of the three trucks), they cannot 
be said to have given the Defendants/Respondents any interest in money, land, or possessions. R. 
191-192. The com1 further determined that "[ s ]ince the vehicles sold for the residual 
amount. .. Kenworth did not satisfy Skinner's debt." R. 192. "Without a debt to satisfy," the court 
held, "there is no benefit conferred upon Skinner by Kenworth, and its unjust enrichment claim 
fails." Id. But, what is missing entirely from the court's analysis is any application of the language 
from Med. Recovery Services regarding one who "performs services beneficial to or at the request 
of another" or who "in any other way adds to the other's advantage." 
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Kenworth performed services for STI and the Skinner brothers by taking in the trucks at 
the end of the lease, cleaning, repairing and storing them, and paying off their obligations under 
the lease to GE. At the time that the trucks were surrendered, Kenworth employees informed the 
Skinners that this would be done, and no objection was made. These actions were indisputably 
beneficial to the Defendants/Respondents, as had they not been done, STI and the Skinners would 
have remained liable for an obligation that they admit they could not have repaid.2 Furthermore, 
these actions clearly added to STI's advantage, as Kenworth's actions enabled STI (and the 
Skinners) to walk away from an obligation of over $50,000.00. 
Even if this Court were to determine that it is arguable whether or not Kenworth's actions 
satisfy the meaning of this language from Med. Recovery Services, the district court's failure to 
even address these issues in its analysis is clear error. Therefore, the district court's determination 
that no benefit was conferred should either be overruled or remanded for further determination. 
ii. The District Court erred when it determined that Kenworth did not satisfy the 
Defendants/Respondents' debt. 
In analyzing the first element of Kenworth's unjust enrichment claim, the district court 
determined that with regard to Kenworth's decision to pay off the residual lease amounts owed by 
the Defendants/Respondents on each of the three trucks, "Kenworth did not satisfy Skinner's 
debt." Such a conclusion is unsupported by any reasonable interpretation of the facts. 
It was established at trial that ( 1) STI was obligated to GE under the lease for the residual 
amounts on each vehicle, (2) the Skinner brothers were also so obligated as personal guarantors, 
(3) at the end of the lease term, the Skinners were unable to sell, purchase, or finance the trucks 
2 Under these TRAC leases, STI was liable at the end of the lease term for the residual amounts on each of the three 
trucks. While it could have chosen to purchase the trucks for that amount, sell them to a third party, or surrender 
them to be sold, risking the chance of a deficiency, the underlying liability for the residual amounts remained the 
same. 
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and lacked the resources to pay the outstanding residual amounts, (4) Jim Skinner knew that the 
value of the trucks was significantly lower than the outstanding residual amounts, (5) Kenworth 
informed Jim Skinner that they would take the trucks and see what they could do to help,3 (6) the 
Skinners surrendered the trucks to Kenworth, and (7) Kenworth paid GE exactly what STI owed 
under the lease. The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn from these facts is that 
Kenworth's actions satisfied the Defendants/Respondents' debt. 
The trial court seems to have determined that because the lease language stated that STI 
would only be liable for a deficiency should GE sell the trucks at the end of the lease term for less 
than the residual amounts, and because Ken worth paid off the entire residual amounts before such 
an auction occurred, STI and the Skinner brothers simply owed no debt to GE for Kenworth to 
satisfy. However, such a conclusion ignores the facts presented at trial. 
Jim Skinner admitted at trial that the trucks were worth $42,000.00 each at the time that 
the trucks were surrendered and that the residual amounts due under the lease were $58,021.20 per 
truck. He also admitted that he had tried to sell the trucks on his own, but failed, tried to finance 
the purchase of the trucks and failed, and that STI was broke and therefore lacked the funds to pay 
a deficiency that was certain given the trucking market at the time. Tr. 63-66, 74-76. Finally, he 
further admitted that before turning the trucks in, STI stripped them of their auxiliary power units 
and sold them for $12,000.00, further depressing the trucks' value. Tr. 73-74. Under these 
circumstances, at the time that the trucks were surrendered, STI was indebted to GE under the 
lease.4 
3 Tr. ll0-113. 
4 STI owed the residual amounts at the end of the lease term, regardless of whether or not GE could sell the trucks 
for more than the residual amount (in which case STI's liability would end and it would be entitled to a surplus) or 
less than that amount (in which case STI would be on the hook for a deficiency). 
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The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines debt as "something owed: OBLIGATION." 
Debt, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2nd ed. 2016). Under the facts presented at trial, STI was 
obligated at the end of the lease to either purchase the trucks from GE for the residual amounts or 
to pay the difference between the amount that the trucks were sold for and the residual amounts as 
a deficiency. The Defendants admitted at trial that the trucks were worth considerably less than 
the residual amounts at time of surrender and that they couldn't purchase them, finance them, or 
sell them themselves. Therefore, at the time of surrender, the Defendants were obligated to GE 
under the lease for a deficiency, which Ken worth stepped in and paid off in full. Under these facts, 
Kenworth satisfied the Defendants' debt, and as such, the first element of a prima facie unjust 
enrichment case was proven at trial. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Considered and Applied the "Officious 
Intermeddler Rule," as it is an Affirmative Defense that was Never Pied by the 
Defendants or Asserted either Before or During Trial. 
The district court erred when it based its decision in favor of the Defendants/Respondents 
on an affirmative defense that was never pied or argued, either before or during trial. Doing so 
was contrary to Idaho caselaw and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudicing Plaintiff by 
eliminating its ability to address the defense with either facts or argument at trial. Additionally, 
the district court's application of the defense was cursory and ran contrary to the manifest weight 
of the evidence. 
i. The officious intermeddler rule is an affirmative defense that was waived when 
unpled. 
Idaho's courts have long recognized the officious intermeddler rule as a defense to an 
unjust enrichment claim. See Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1997); 
Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 790 P .2d 3 72 (Ct. App. 1989); Teton 
Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 195 P.3d 1207 (2008) ("Unjust enrichment will not 
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apply in the instance of an officious intermeddler."). While the rule is never explicitly referred to 
as an affirmative defense, it is certainly treated as such by the courts. See Teton Peaks, 146 Idaho 
at 398-99, 195 P.3d at 1211-12 (listing the elements of an unjust enrichment claim and then 
discussing the officious intermeddler rule); Curtis, 130 Idaho at 382,941 P.2d at 354 (listing the 
elements of a prima facie unjust enrichment case and then stating that " [t]he principle of unjust 
enrichment, however, is applicable only if the person conferring the benefit is not an "officious 
intermeddler."); Chinchuretta, 117 Idaho at 593, 790 P.2d at 374 (applying the rule as a defense, 
separate and apaii from an analysis of the three elements of an unjust enrichment claim). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines an affirmative defense as "[a] defendant's asse1iion of 
facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecution's claim, even if all the 
allegations in the complaint are true." Affirmative Defense, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
That definition describes the officious intermeddler rule. One can satisfy the three elements of a 
prima facie unjust enrichment claim and nevertheless fail in his claim if the court determines that 
the action was that of an intermeddler. In fact, an analysis of the trial court's application of the 
rule leads to the unavoidable conclusion that such is exactly what the trial comi did. 
After determining that Plaintiff never conferred a benefit on the defendants when it paid 
GE the residual amounts on each of the three trucks, the trial court then determined that with regard 
to the past due lease payments, the first element of an unjust enrichment claim had been met. R. 
192. The court went on to state that "[ e ]ven assuming the other two prongs of unjust enrichment 
can be met in both claims, the doctrine of the officious intermeddler should be examined." Id. By 
applying the defense of officious intermeddler to defeat Plaintiffs claims, after assuming that 
Plaintiff had met all three elements of its unjust enrichment claim, one can only conclude that the 
trial court applied the doctrine as an affirmative defense. 
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Furthermore, this Court explained in Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 163, 559 P.2d 1123, 
1131 n.1 (1976), that affirmative defenses "generally are defenses in which the defendant has the 
burden of introducing evidence and persuading the finder of fact. . . which the plaintiff may defeat 
by the introduction of evidence of his own." Here, the trial court recognized that the officious 
intermeddler doctrine operates to prevent an unjust enrichment claim where "a mere volunteer 
who, without request therefor, confers a benefit upon another" and that an individual "is not an 
intermeddler if such person has a valid reason for conferring the benefit, such as protecting an 
interest." R. 190-191, citing to Curtis. In sum, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the 
absence of any request (i.e. voluntariness), after which the plaintiff may then defeat that defense 
by presenting evidence of a valid reason. Therefore, under the language cited from Paxton, the 
officious intermeddler rule is an affirmative defense. 
An affirmative defense must be either asserted or waived. I.R.C.P. 8(b )(1 )a states that "[i]n 
responding to a pleading, a party must: (A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim 
asserted against it; and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party." 
1.R.C.P 8( c )(1) states that "[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any 
avoidance or affirmative defense .. .. " The purpose of that rule "is to alert the parties concerning 
the issues of fact which will be tried and to afford them an opportunity to present evidence to meet 
those defenses." Paxton, 98 Idaho at 163,559 P.2d at 1131 n.1. 
Here, the Defendants/ Appellants never raised the defense of officious intermeddling, either 
before or during trial. It was not pied in their Answer and it was absent from their Trial Brief. 5 
Similarly, the Defendants/ Appellants failed to raise the defense during trial6 and made no attempt 
5 For the Answer, see R. 16-19. For the Defendants' Trial Brief, see R. 98-106. 
6 The defense waived an opening statement and in lieu of closing statements, the parties were instructed to submit 
closing briefs. Tr. 58, 184. 
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to amend their Answer to conform to the evidence presented at trial. Instead, the issue was raised 
for the first time in the Defendants' closing brief, filed with the Court three days after trial, leaving 
the Plaintiff/Respondent no opportunity to respond.7 
This amounted to little more than trial by ambush, where Plaintiff was given no notice of 
a key defense, the Defendants/ Appellants made no attempt to argue the defense, and yet the court 
considered, applied, and based its decision almost entirely on it. Plaintiff was under no 
requirement to anticipate every possible defense that the Defendant might raise in its post-trial 
closing brief, and to painstakingly present evidence to counter each such possible defense at trial. 
Avoiding such a scenario is the very purpose behind the pleading requirements of I.R.C.P. 8(b) 
and ( c ). Therefore, by failing to raise the defense of officious intermeddling before or even during 
trial, the Defendants/ Appellants waived the defense and it was error for the trial court to rely on it 
as its basis to deny Plaintiff recovery. 
ii. The District Court also erred in its application of the officious intermeddler 
affirmative defense. 
Even if this Court finds that the officious intermeddler defense was not waived, and 
therefore that the trial court did not err in considering said defense, the trial court erred in its 
application of that doctrine to the facts established at trial. 
The district court was correct in stating that the officious intermeddler rule operates to 
defeat an unjust enrichment claim where a plaintiff is found to be "a mere volunteer who, without 
request therefor," conferred a benefit upon a defendant. Idaho's caselaw on the matter, although 
sparse, makes this clear. See Curtis, 130 Idaho at 382,941 P.2d at 354; Teton Peaks, 146 Idaho at 
398, 195 P.3d at 1211. However, the same caselaw also makes it clear that the defense does not 
7 For the Defendants' closing brief, see R. 114-126. Defense counsel admitted at a hearing on 1/16/18 before Judge 
Shindurling that he didn't even come across the officious intermeddler defense until working on his closing 
argument after trial. 
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apply where the party conferring said benefit "has a valid reason" for doing so. Curtis, 130 Idaho 
at 3 82, 941 P .2d at 3 54. This is where the trial court's reasoning fails. 
In its analysis on this issue, the trial court stated the following: 
The only question left is whether Kenworth had a valid reason to do so. Testimony at trial 
established that the only reason Kenworth had for purchasing the vehicles from GE is that 
they wanted to keep Skinner in business. There was no testimony indicating that Kenworth 
had an interest in the trucks and while they had a past relationship with Skinner, there is 
no indication that Skinner would continue to do business with them. 
R. 193. In these three short sentences, the trial court (1) recognized Plaintiffs reason for satisfying 
the Defendants/Appellants' debt to GE (to keep STI in business) and then (2) simply chose to 
ignore it. We have zero explanation as to why Kenworth's desire to keep a long-time customer in 
business was not considered a valid reason for satisfying STI's debt to GE. Additionally, the final 
statement, that there was "no indication that Skinner would continue to do business with them" is 
unsupported by any evidence in the record and is actually contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 8 Therefore, the trial court erred in its determination that a valid reason for Plaintiff's 
actions did not exist, and as such, the officious intermeddler rule was improperly applied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/ Appellant respectfully requests that this Com1 enter 
an order reversing the decision of the district court, finding that the Plaintiff has proven its unjust 
enrichment claim. 
8 The only evidence presented at trial was that Kenworth and STI had a business relationship spanning forty plus 
years, that STI was a valued customer ofKenworth, and that Kenworth was concerned that STI may have been 
facing financial ruin. 
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